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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3517 
_____________ 
 
RALPH SUNY, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA;  
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF DELAWARE;  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                                             
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-12-cv-01469) 
District Judge: The Honorable Jan E. DuBois 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 19, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 28, 2017) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________________ 
 
                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Ralph Suny appeals the order of the District Court denying the habeas corpus 
petition he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  He contends that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for two reasons: (1) counsel failed to object to a jury instruction that did not 
explain that a person can be guilty of a single conspiracy to commit multiple crimes, and 
(2) counsel failed to adequately investigate alibi witness testimony. For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm.  
I1 
 Ralph Suny was charged in Pennsylvania state court with eight counts of burglary, 
and eight counts of conspiracy to commit burglary and related offenses. The charges arise 
from a total of eight home invasions that occurred between August and September of 
2003.  
At trial, the judge gave jury instructions explaining the elements of conspiracy in 
general, but did not explain that a person can be guilty of a single conspiracy to commit 
multiple crimes. Suny’s counsel did not request any such instruction and did not object to 
the instruction that was given. The jury convicted Suny of one count of first degree 
burglary, one count of second degree burglary, three counts of conspiracy to commit 
burglary, and one count of driving under the influence.   
                                                          
1 Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we set forth 
only those facts necessary to our conclusion.   
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After sentencing, Suny moved for a new trial. After he was appointed new 
counsel, Suny claimed, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to investigate and present the alibi witness testimony of his mother and aunt. The 
trial court held a hearing on that motion and heard Suny’s family’s testimony as well as 
that of both of Suny’s trial attorneys. The court concluded that Suny’s mother and aunt’s 
claims that Suny’s attorneys ignored their alibi information and failed to adequately 
investigate “lacked credibility.”2 Rather, the court credited Suny’s attorneys’ testimony 
that they conducted a thorough investigation of any potential alibi testimony, and that 
Suny’s mother and aunt never made the attorneys aware of their potential alibi evidence.3 
Based on these findings, the court concluded that “trial counsel was unaware of the 
existence of the proffered alibi testimony, and cannot be found ineffective for failing to 
call these witnesses.”4  
Suny appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. His claims there included 
the ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to present alibi testimony. The Superior 
Court rejected Suny’s claims, concluding that because the record contained “ample 
factual support” for the trial court’s conclusion that Suny’s attorneys had done a thorough 
investigation into alibi witness testimony, “there [was] no basis upon which [the] Court 
[could] disturb the findings of the trial court that [the attorneys] had not been ineffective 
                                                          
2 J.A. at 92–93; Commonwealth v. Suny (Suny I), Nos. 6903-03, 6906-03, 6915-03, slip 
op. at 22–23 (Del. Cty. Com. Pl. June 27, 2005). 
3 J.A. at 86–96; Suny I, slip op. at 16–26. 
4 J.A. 96; Suny I, slip op. at 26.  
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in failing to produce alibi testimony.”5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Suny’s 
request for appeal.6 
Thereafter, Suny filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to 
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), alleging thirteen errors. Among 
the errors listed, Suny claimed that the jury instruction on conspiracy was faulty under 
state law. Suny also generally claimed that his counsel was ineffective. However, he did 
not explicitly present the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to the conspiracy charge. The closest Suny got to articulating the ineffectiveness claim he 
now argues is a statement in his PCRA brief that he was eligible for relief due to 
“[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so 
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 
innocence could have taken place.”7  Suny went on to state that appellate counsel “failed 
to appeal issues to the highest courts,” referencing Part A and B of his PCRA brief.8 Part 
A of Suny’s brief, entitled “ALL ISSUES,” included an outline of his claim that the jury 
instructions were deficient for failure to include an explanation of single conspiracy and 
stated that appellate counsel “failed to argue illegal conviction of MULTIPLE 
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CHARGES.”9  
                                                          
5 J.A. at 119–21; Commonwealth v. Suny (Suny II), 915 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) 
(unpublished table decision).  
6 Commonwealth v. Suny (Suny III), 927 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2007). 
7 J.A. at 128. 
8 J.A. at 129. 
9 J.A. at 142. 
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Suny’s appointed PCRA counsel moved to withdraw because he concluded that 
Suny’s claims lacked merit.10 In PCRA counsel’s “no merit” letter, he outlined the issues 
in Suny’s PCRA brief but did not articulate Suny’s current claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failure to object to the instruction. The PCRA court granted the motion to 
withdraw and dismissed Suny’s petition without a hearing.11  
Suny appealed. This time, however, he did clearly articulate his ineffective 
assistance claim based on the allegedly faulty conspiracy instruction.12 The Superior 
Court affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of Suny’s petition, holding that his ineffective 
assistance claim was waived under Pennsylvania law because Suny failed to raise it in his 
brief or PCRA petition.13 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Suny’s petition for 
allowance of appeal.14 
Suny then filed a pro se petition for habeas relief, raising seven constitutional 
claims, all of which were rejected by the District Court.15 We granted a certificate of 
appealability on five issues, two of which Suny withdrew in his reply brief.16 Thus the 
following issues articulated in the certificate of appealability remain before us: (1) 
                                                          
10 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988). 
11 Commonwealth v. Suny (Suny IV), Nos. 6903-03, 6906-03, 6915-03, slip op. 198, 198 
(Del. Cty. Com. Pl. June 23, 2008). 
12 J.A. at 148 (“Was the attorney ineffective for not raising the issue of multiple 
conspiracy vs. single conspiracy[?]”). 
13 J.A. at 155–56; Commonwealth v. Suny (Suny V), 987 A.2d 825 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) 
(unpublished table decision). 
14 Commonwealth v. Suny (Suny VI), 15 A.3d 67 (Pa. 2011). 
15 Suny v. Pennsylvania (Suny VII), No. CIV.A. 12-1469, 2014 WL 772439, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 27, 2014). 
16 Reply Br. at 11 n.2. 
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whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty for 
a single conspiracy even though multiple conspiracies were charged, (2) whether trial and 
appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to request the instruction or challenge its 
absence, and (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and 
present the alibi witness testimony of Suny’s mother and aunt. Because the record 
supports the trial court’s finding that Suny did not inform his trial counsel of potential 
alibi witnesses, we need only discuss that claim briefly. We will address the first two 
claims together as they raise the same issue.17  
II 
Suny’s appeal is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus 
unless the petitioner “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”18 
To do so, “the petitioner must fairly present all federal claims to the highest state court 
before bringing them in federal court.”19 If claims are fairly presented—and therefore 
“exhausted” in state court—federal courts may grant habeas relief only if a state court’s 
adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States[,]” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
                                                          
17 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We have 
appellate jurisdiction to review the certified issues under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Because the 
District Court held no evidentiary hearing, our review is plenary. Simmons v. Beard, 590 
F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009). 
18 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 
19 Stevens v. Del. Corr. Ctr., 295 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 
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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.”20  
Even if a petitioner asserted a claim in state court, however, a federal court may 
not review it on the merits where a state court’s denial of relief rests on a violation of a 
state procedural rule, provided that the state rule “is independent of the federal question 
and adequate to support the judgment.”21 Such claims are procedurally defaulted, and we 
are unable to review them unless the petitioner can show cause and prejudice to excuse 
the default.22  
Under this framework, we first consider whether Suny is procedurally barred from 
pursuing his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contemporaneously 
object to the trial court’s conspiracy instruction.  
A 
Suny argues that the evidence in his case supported a jury finding of a single 
conspiracy rather than multiple conspiracies. Put another way, Suny argues that the jury 
could have found based on the evidence that the burglaries were conducted pursuant to a 
single agreement to commit multiple burglaries instead of multiple agreements to commit 
each burglary. Had the jury found that Suny had agreed only to a single conspiracy, his 
sentence may well have been less than he received. Moreover, there is evidence to 
support such a finding: The three burglaries that led to Suny’s only convictions were 
                                                          
20 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100–02 (2011). 
21 Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 2007). 
22 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982). 
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committed by the same conspirators, and took place only three nights apart and within a 
half mile of each other.23 Suny therefore claims that under Pennsylvania law, he was 
entitled to an instruction that informed the jury that he could be convicted of a single 
conspiracy had his counsel requested one.24 Thus, according to Suny, he was prejudiced 
under the Strickland v. Washington25 standard by his trial counsel’s failure to object to 
the instruction as given. However, we are unable to consider the merits of Suny’s 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim because he waived it in state court.26 
Pennsylvania law requires that a defendant convicted at trial present any 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his or her initial PCRA petition—or else the 
claims are waived.27 All PCRA claims must be explicitly raised in the petition to avoid 
such a waiver.28 Suny argues that he did adequately raise his ineffective assistance claim 
                                                          
23 We take no position as to whether Suny was entitled to such an instruction under 
Pennsylvania law as “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” 
Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1991). Thus, our inquiry here is limited to whether 
Suny is entitled to relief based on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request such an instruction. 
24 See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 768 A.2d 309, 316 (Pa. 2001); 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 903(c) (“If a person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of 
only one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement 
or continuous conspiratorial relationship.”).  
25 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
26 To the extent that Suny seeks to recast his state law claim for relief as a constitutional 
due process claim, See Appellant’s Br. at 28, Reply Br. at 7–8, this claim is also 
procedurally defaulted and unreviewable for the same reasons as Suny’s ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim.  
27 Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002). 
28 Pa. R. Crim. P. 902(B) (“Each ground relied upon in support of the relief requested 
shall be stated in the petition. Failure to state such a ground in the petition shall preclude 
the defendant from raising that ground in any proceeding for post-conviction collateral 
relief.”); Pa. R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot 
 
 9 
that he pursues here—specifically, that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to object 
to the jury instructions on conspiracy. First, Suny notes that he indicated on his petition 
that he was entitled to relief, in part, because of “[i]neffective assistance of counsel 
which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth determining 
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.”29 
Second, Suny notes that he wrote that appellate counsel “failed to appeal issues to the 
highest courts,” referencing Parts A and B of his brief.30 Part A of Suny’s brief, entitled 
“ALL ISSUES,” argued, among other things, that the jury instructions were deficient 
because they failed to include an explanation of single conspiracy.31 Thus, Suny argues, 
he adequately raised the issue he claims here and it was not waived.  
However, even affording Suny the liberal construction afforded to all pro se 
litigants,32 the extremely general and overbroad statements in his PCRA petition and brief 
do not come close to providing the necessary factual and legal underpinnings to present 
the specific ineffectiveness claim he argues here.33 Accordingly, Suny’s petition was not 
sufficiently clear to allow his appointed PCRA counsel or the PCRA court to understand 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
be raised for the first time on appeal.”). See also 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9543 
(“To be eligible for [post-conviction] relief . . ., petitioner must plead and prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence  . . . [t]hat the conviction or sentence resulted from one or 
more of the following: . . . Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances 
of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable 
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” (emphasis added)). 
29 Appellant’s Br. at 32; J.A. at 128. 
30 Appellant’s Br. at 32; J.A. at 129.  
31 J.A. at 129, 142. 
32 Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). 
33 See id. at 245. 
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that he was raising the ineffectiveness claim argued here. Suny’s counsel only outlined 
his claim that appellate counsel—not trial counsel—was deficient for failing to pursue the 
state law claim on appeal. The PCRA court responded only to the argument that appellate 
counsel was ineffective.34 The Superior Court affirmed, holding that “neither Appellant’s 
PCRA petition nor his brief makes any claim of ineffectiveness for [counsel’s] failure to 
[object to the jury conspiracy charge], nor of post trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue 
of trial counsel’s omission on appeal. Accordingly, both claims are waived.”35 In sum, 
Suny’s failure to adequately raise this issue before the PCRA court precluded him from 
raising it subsequently on appeal before the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Consequently, 
the claim was dismissed on procedural grounds and not considered on its merits.  
Such a dismissal on the state procedural grounds constitutes an independent and 
adequate state ground upon which to uphold a petitioner’s conviction.36 As discussed 
above, procedurally defaulted claims that rest on independent and adequate state grounds 
are ordinarily unreviewable on federal collateral review.37 
                                                          
34 Suny IV, slip op. at 201–02. 
35 J.A. at 156.  
36 A state procedural rule is “independent” if it is separate from the federal issue. That 
requirement is met here. Cabrera v. Barbo, 175 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 1999). A state 
procedural rule is “adequate” if it was “firmly established and regularly followed” at the 
time of the alleged procedural default. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991). This 
requirement is also met here. Based on Rule of Criminal Procedure 902(B) and Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 302(a), Pennsylvania courts routinely decline to consider on appeal 
an argument that was not explicitly raised in the PCRA petition. See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 39 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v. Bracey, 795 A.2d 935, 940 n.4 
(Pa. 2001). 
37 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 
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Suny argues that the state court misapplied state procedural rules and incorrectly 
concluded that his claim was waived. However, federal courts generally will not consider 
whether the state court properly applied its own default rule to the petitioner’s facts.38 In 
any event, we agree with the Superior Court that under Pennsylvania law, Suny’s PCRA 
brief did not adequately raise the ineffective assistance claim he now attempts to raise 
and he therefore waived the claim.39 Therefore, Suny’s ineffective assistance claim based 
                                                          
38 Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal 
habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). See also 
Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 377 (4th Cir. 2010) (“A federal habeas court does not have 
license to question a state court’s finding of procedural default or to question whether the 
state court properly applied its own law.” (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted)); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Federal habeas courts 
lack jurisdiction, however, to review state court applications of state procedural rules.”); 
Schleeper v. Groose, 36 F.3d 735, 737 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[A] state’s misapplication of its 
own procedural rule is not cause for default.”); Barksdale v. Lane, 957 F.2d 379, 383–84 
(7th Cir. 1992) (“[A] federal court sitting in habeas corpus is required to respect a state 
court’s finding of waiver or procedural default under state law. Federal courts do not sit 
to correct errors made by state courts in the interpretation and application of state law.”); 
Richardson v. Thigpen, 883 F.2d 895, 898 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 934 
(1989) (“[Petitioner] argues that the state misapplied its own procedural default rules; this 
does not constitute cause within the meaning of Strickland.”). 
39 See Bond, 819 A.2d at 39–40 (holding that “boilerplate” and “bald allegation[s]” of 
ineffective assistance of counsel “tacked on to waived claims of trial court error” were 
insufficient to avoid waiving the claims); Bracey, 795 A.2d at 940 n.4 (concluding that a 
PCRA petition that “tack[ed] a on sentence that trial and appellate counsel were 
ineffective for failing to raise and/or properly litigate the underlying claims” was an 
“undeveloped argument, which fail[ed] to meaningfully discuss and apply the standard 
governing the review of ineffectiveness claims” and therefore the petitioner “[did] not 
satisfy [his] burden of establishing that he is entitled to any relief”). 
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on counsel’s failure to object to the conspiracy jury instruction is procedurally defaulted 
and the merits of the claim are unreviewable here.40 
B 
Next, Suny argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 
investigate and present alibi witness testimony. We agree with the District Court that 
there was “nothing unreasonable in the state courts’ treatment of this claim.”41 Both the 
Court of Common Pleas and Superior Court reasonably found, after a careful review of 
the evidence, that Suny’s attorneys’ testimony was more credible than Suny’s family’s 
claims that counsel ignored their potential alibi testimony.42 Therefore, under the 
Strickland standard, the state courts reasonably concluded that Suny’s counsel’s 
investigation was adequate and that the choice not to elicit Suny’s family’s unhelpful 
testimony at trial was not ineffective assistance.  
III 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
denying a writ of habeas corpus.  
                                                          
40 We note that under the Supreme Court’s recent case, Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 
(2012), ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims procedurally defaulted under state 
law may be reviewable on habeas if the prisoner’s collateral review counsel is found to 
have been ineffective for failing to raise them. Id. at 14. However, Suny has not argued 
that his appointed PCRA counsel was ineffective and we therefore do not consider 
Martinez’s application here.    
41 Suny VII, 2014 WL 772439, at *18. 
42 Suny I, slip op. at 14–26; Suny II, slip op. at 10–12. 
